The old is dying, the victory is fragile: Will the progressive comeback reshape Philippine democracy?

The 2025 midterm elections did more than surprise—they exposed the shifting ground beneath Philippine democracy. What polling firms once dismissed as another rout for the progressive opposition turned out to be its most significant electoral breakthrough in nearly a decade. Liberal-progressive candidates not only returned to the Senate—they surged into its top ranks. Akbayan shattered party-list records. The results defied incumbency logic and challenged assumptions about voter behavior.

But this is not yet a turning point. It is a fragile opening.

As the dust settles, progressives must ask: Is this a realignment—or just a rupture? A wave—or a warning? And most urgently, how do they consolidate fragile gains in a political system still shaped by populism, disinformation, personality politics, and entrenched power?

This article—grounded in discussions from a recent Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Philippines debriefing—argues that the old order may be crumbling, but the new has not yet arrived. To shape that future, progressives will need more than momentum. They will need coalitions, ground work, and a strategic reimagining of politics itself.

A year of surprises vis-à-vis electoral realignments

According to De La Salle University Professor Julio Teehankee, future political scientists will refer to the previous elections as the surprise of 2025. What were these surprises?

First is the strong showing of the liberal-progressive opposition. Both Bam Aquino and Kiko Pangilinan not only returned to the Senate but secured positions within the top five. Meanwhile, Akbayan emerged as the leading party-list group, achieving the highest number of votes ever recorded for any party-list in Philippine electoral history. Mamamayang Liberal (ML) Party-list also managed to secure one seat in Congress. However, the victory of the liberal-progressive bloc is not complete. It is obvious that the Duterte camp won the narrative war by offering a simplified message of “Save Sara, Bring Him Home.” This has enabled the Dutertes to consolidate its vote base and further challenge the administration.

Second is the defeat of the administration coalition. Based on previous elections, midterm elections are always to the advantage of the incumbent. But not in 2025. The results of the recent elections show the faltering of ayuda politics and the failure of the Alyansa to maximize the incumbency advantage.

We thus see the further deepening and extension of polarization—from social media which now bleeds along ethno-linguistic lines. Northern Luzon is the reliable base of the administration, while Visayas and Mindanao are the natural constituencies of the Duterte-led opposition. And now, Bicol has become the power base of the emerging liberal-progressive coalition.

Partisanship, regionalism and public sentiment

Cleve Arguelles of WR Numero asserts that these surprises are not historical flukes but are the results of the collapse of the Marcos-Duterte alliance. No single camp dominated the race, opening up multiple and unpredictable pathways to victory.

Bong Go’s strong showing, for example, was not just due to the Duterte base. He received more than 16 million votes from the National Capital Region (NCR), Mindanao and the Visayas (excluding Western Visayas), constituting 62% of his total votes. Second-placer Bam Aquino drew his core support from more liberal-leaning regions such as NCR, Central Luzon, Calabarzon, Bicol, and Western Visayas, which made up 62% of his total votes. Interestingly, he placed sixth in Cebu, a Duterte stronghold, but fared poorly in Davao. Other Duterte allies such as Bato dela Rosa, Jimmy Bondoc, and Philip Salvador performed well in Mindanao and parts of the Visayas, while administration candidates like Erwin Tulfo, Ping Lacson, and Tito Sotto drew nearly 70% of their votes from Luzon, excluding key liberal regions.

Arguelles’ analysis tells us that regional loyalties still played a powerful role. Marcos retained strength in northern and central Luzon. Duterte loyalists held sway in parts of Mindanao. Many voters continued to choose based on personality or geography, not necessarily platforms.

Public opinion was also mixed. They were defined by sharp, often hostile polarization. It’s worth noting that despite the noise, surveys continued to show that voters’ top concerns remained basic: job creation and food security. Not the ICC case. Not even dynasty politics.  

Gender political dynamics

Sexist rhetoric was a recurring issue throughout the 2025 campaign season, with multiple incidents drawing public condemnation and sparking institutional responses. The instances of repeated offenses highlighted a persistent culture of misogyny in political discourse—and underscored the urgent need for stricter enforcement of respectful campaigning standards and more robust support for women in public life.

Unfortunately, as Dr. Jean Encinas-Franco of the University of the Philippines explained, the midterm polls did not offer any significant space for gender issues. Divorce, anti-discrimination and other gender-related concerns were not the dominant narratives of the 2025 elections. This is partly due to the sheer number of hopefuls running for public office. Because there were 66 candidates competing for 12 Senate seats, the focus was on voter awareness, to the detriment of more substantive issues.

Yet, despite the challenges, Franco asserts that the recent elections still offer several bright spots. There was a clamor from citizens to disqualify candidates who uttered misogynist remarks.  And because of public clamor, the COMELEC was forced to act on the complaints despite its workload.

Also, two of the most maligned women-politicians in the previous administration won in the elections. Former Vice President Leni Robredo won as mayor of Naga, while Leila de Lima will enter the Lower House as party-list representative of ML party-list. While their victory cannot be interpreted as a complete repudiation of Duterte’s style of misogynistic politics, it does open up a space for the voice progressive and independent-minded women to be heard.

Civic engagement, values and moral framing

Rappler’s Pia Ranada points out that it has also become extremely difficult for media to reach voters and help them make informed decisions. The main challenge is the jadedness among voters in getting news. We are now living in an information ecosystem that is dominated by big tech which, in turn, are developing algorithms that favor controversial content.  As a result, people are now consuming information within their own silos or echo chambers. Less people are watching TV or reading newspapers. Instead, people rely more on social media platforms for news. This gives candidates even less reason to give interviews or join debates or attend townhall meetings.

There is a need for the revival of the social plaza through fact-based discourse. We need to bring back the plaza, with media as the “third space” where people emerge from their siloes and work together as citizens. Through the convening power of facts, media must mediate between differences and link citizens with those in power, while also remaining vigilant against disinformation and abuse.

But reclaiming the social plaza is not just about where we talk—it's also about how we talk. As the campaign unfolded, it became clear that progressives were not only challenging disinformation but also rethinking the tone and framing of their message. This shift was most evident in their move away from “moral politics”—where political battles are cast not just as contests of ideas, but as struggles between good and evil. A concept that was introduced by Wataru Kusaka to refer to a kind of politics that “creates groups that are seen as either ‘good’ or ‘evil’ and draw a demarcation line between the two,” moral politics has often been associated with middle class-led civil society and with liberal reform-minded politicians. However, this time around, progressives seem to have learned their lesson.

Kiko Pangilinan and Bam Aquino embodied this shift in approach by stepping away from the old moral framing of Daang Matuwid and Gobyernong Tapat. Their continued bump in the pre-election surveys might have reflected that shift—less preaching, more precision. Their messaging feels sharper, less tied to the moral high ground that once defined their brand. The focus went to their advocacy for food security and education respectively. One telling moment: they stayed silent after Duterte’s arrest. Are they compromising their values? Probably not. But they’re being strategic. Staying in the moral lane just isn’t enough anymore—especially when the audience has changed.

Was it enough? The voters responded with an overwhelming “Yes” and they are set to assume their Senate seats on June 30.

Polarization, populism, and the hard road ahead

The progressive comeback in 2025 is real—but it is also brittle. Populism remains potent. Partisan loyalties run deep. Disinformation still dominates the digital space. And the conditions that enabled this electoral win—fractured incumbency, voter fatigue, and regional realignments—may not hold in the next cycle.

What comes next will depend on whether progressives can translate this moment into movement. That means shifting from campaign to coalition. From moral positioning to material advocacy. From electoral cycles to sustained civic engagement.

They must listen harder and organize deeper—especially outside their strongholds. They must take on the country’s core anxieties: jobs, justice, food, dignity. They must risk imperfect alliances, work across ideological lines, and speak with moral clarity but strategic humility.

The window is narrow. The old is dying. And the new will not be born unless progressives deliver it into being.

Otherwise, 2025 may be remembered not as the start of democratic renewal—but as its last flash of hope.

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